Therefore, the first requirement is to determine whether a person is capable of making their own decisions (i.e. is not of "sound mind"). If capable, they make their own decisions, unless an interference is warranted as above. If not capable, decisions must be made on their behalf. Whilst the law has developed since the decision in Re F 4 to produce a test for incapacity 5 and to expand the types of factors to be taken into account when declaring the legal position in relation to an incapacitated adult, 6 we firmly hold to the view that there is still a requirement for legislation. The introduction of a Mental Incapacity Act would provide still needed clarity and ensure that decisions can unequivocally be made 7 in all areas 8 when needed. 9 This legislation should come first.
10 Thus, where a person has a mental disorder that impairs their decision-making capacity, the first requirement would be to determine if they were capable of making their own decisions. If not, such decisions would be made under the auspices of a Mental Incapacity Act which would produce decisions in the best interests of the incapacitated adult.
11 If someone is capable of making the decision, that must then be binding and advanced refusals should, where valid, be binding. 
[1990] 2 A.C. 1. Subsequently, it has become clear that (a) the courts are looking for there to be a "serious justiciable issue" to trigger the jurisdiction of the High Court to make a declaration; this may be no different from the need to look for a civil wrong to which a defence, such as necessity, was required, as was the analysis by the House of Lords in Re F, but it is open to a broader interpretation. In fact, in all the subsequent decisions it is possible to identify a civil wrong; (b) the jurisdiction to issue the declaration is not limited to an assessment of best medical or scientific interests, but best interests "encompasses medical, emotional and all other
welfare issues", per Butler Sloss P. in Re A (medical treatment: male sterilisation) [2000] 1 F.C.R. 193, and see Re F (adult: court's jurisdiction) [2000] 3 F.C.R. 30; and (c) Patient: Sterilisation) [2001 ] Fam 15. 5 See, now, Re MB [1997 and see Re C [1994] (1999, Cm 4465), at paras. 13-20. A Mental Health Act would exist only to cover those circumstances where the person presented a danger to others and so interference could be justified on that basis, notwithstanding the person's capacity to make decisions or even their refusal to accept treatment. Once detained, the logic would suggest that treatment could only be provided for the reason that permitted the initial detention, so any treatment falling outside that justification would have to be authorised either with a capable person's consent or through the Mental Incapacity Act for an incapable person. So, treatments to reduce the risks presented to others would be the only treatments for mental disorder that would be permissible. 13 The Mental Health Act would not permit interference where it was for the interests of the person affected. Therefore, we would fundamentally restructure the legislation package. For the draft Mental Health Bill this would mean no ability to admit, detain and treat any person on the basis of their own health and safety. Thus, any future Mental Health Act would be considerably narrower in scope than at present or as proposed. Most decisions affecting people not capable of decision-making would fall within a Mental Incapacity Act, subject to the possibility (as with people capable of decision-making) of that procedure being overridden by use a Mental Health Act.
it is for the court to determine what is in the incapacitated adult's best interests on the basis that there can only be one option that is in her/his best interests: Re S (Adult
14 Whilst we recognise that the draft Mental Health Bill does, to some extent, endeavour to take capacity and autonomy more seriously, 15 we feel that it does not go far enough.
Dangerous and severe personality disorder
What would this say for the proposals for dangerous and severe personality disorder? Provided there was evidence to establish that there is such a diagnosable condition and that the consequences of it in terms of harm to others could be predicted, there is no reason why such proposals should not be introduced subject to the requirement that there be serious attempts to ameliorate the condition and to avoid incarceration wherever possible. However, the significant problems are whether it is indeed diagnosable with sufficient accuracy and, more tellingly, whether the requisite level of harm can be predicted in an individual case. 16 In particular because of weakness in the latter, it is not likely to reach the level of certainty necessary for interference with freedoms on the basis of anticipated harm and so incarceration must be based upon the commission of harm to others and it being a response to that actual harm and its future prevention. 17 What the draft Bill contains is the facility to be able to detain people where they need treatment, but that treatment does not involve relieving their disorder. This is clarified by the more extended definition of "medical treatment", which now explicitly covers "education, and training in work, social and independent living skills."
18 Further, there is no equivalent of the treatability requirement that appears in the 1983 Act. Thus, "the effect of [the relevant conditions] taken together with the broad definitions of 'mental disorder' and 'medical treatment' … would be to permit the compulsory detention and care of people for the protection of others when the people detained have never been charged with any criminal offence and nothing can be done to alleviate the mental disorder from which they are suffering. This raises human rights issues, flowing mainly from the breadth of the circumstances in which a patient could be subjected to compulsory, nonconsensual, treatment. 
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The Bournewood gap A further consequence of our approach is that there is no need for Part 5, i.e. the proposals for dealing with the so-called Bournewood gap. 22 If a person is not capable of making a decision to be a voluntary patient, such a decision should be made under a Mental Incapacity Act. Admission would be possible, but only if it were in the best interests of the incapacitated adult. As there would be measures for protection from exploitation and abuse within a Mental Incapacity Act, no need for Part 5 arises. It is perhaps only in the proposed Bill because a Mental Incapacity Act is not currently in the Parliamentary timetable. The Government accepts the need to introduce one when Parliamentary time allows. 23 On some of the particular points made in Part 5, one interesting comparison is with the approach that the Government proposes to take with regard to children. The two appear to be inconsistent when the differences between the two groups do not support such a markedly different approach. It is the opinion of the House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights, that children are inadequately protected by the draft Mental Health Bill and that a preferable approach would be to apply the system in Part 5 also to children. A qualifying patient is someone who satisfies certain criteria 27 and for whom a clinical supervisor is appointed. 28 The relevant criteria are:
(a) the patient is 16 or more (b) the patient is suffering from mental disorder (c) that mental disorder is of such a nature or degree as to warrant the provisions of medical treatment to the patient (d) it is necessary for the patient to be resident at a hospital for the treatment and that requirement is likely to continue for at least 28 days (e) the patient is incapable of consenting to the treatment and that condition is likely to continue for at least 28 days (f) the treatment can lawfully be provided without the need for Part 2.
Putting the proposals together means that the treatment will be administered in accordance with the common law. 29 Quite clearly, this is, therefore, in the wrong piece of legislation. What Part 5 does endeavour to do is to provide some safeguards for such patients. Before examining them, it is worth recognising that one of the weaknesses with the current proposed Mental Incapacity Act is the reliance on the general authority to act reasonably in relation to an incapacitated adult without the need for special procedures (except in certain specified cases). The ultimate protection is the ability to have disputes resolved by a judicial forum, but disputes only arise where there are two parties at odds. This may not occur when it is the carer or a professional, etc making decisions about an incapacitated adult. It is possible that the safeguards in the draft Mental Health Bill might be worthy of introduction to the general authority so as to preserve it as an essential element of any Mental Incapacity Act. Under the draft Bill, it will be the responsibility of social services (having been notified by the hospital) to "notify the patient of the help available from mental health advocates," "to appoint a person to act as the patient's nominated person" and "to notify the nominated person of the help so available." 30 The nominated person will have a key role as they should be involved in treatment decisions and, if it appears to him or her that the patient would not have consented to the treatment, the clinical supervisor is to be informed and the treatment is not to go ahead "except in a case of urgency." 31 Why urgency should be a sufficient reason to override what is a form of advance refusal is mysterious. There may be criteria to be introduced here, though we would have thought that an advanced refusal should take priority since the English courts do not recognise any state interests as being sufficient to override the decision of a competent adult. 32 However, this Part operates on a more paternalistic basis, but even then simply a case of urgency would not be sufficient warrant to interfere with the patient's wishes. What might be sufficient, if a paternalistic approach is accepted, might be a treatment that is life-saving or preventing a serious deterioration in their condition. Any treatment will need to fall within the care plan that must be drafted by the clinical supervisor within 28 days of his or her appointment. 
The clinical supervisor is obliged to consult the patient and the nominated person, if practicable.
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That care plan must then be approved by a medical adviser. 35 The care plan must be reviewed every 12 months. 36 Finally, the patient and his/her nominated person has a right of application to the Mental Health Tribunal to seek their discharge, despite not being detained. 37 The tribunal will discharge the patient if "satisfied that [they are] being unlawfully detained at the hospital." 38 We would agree with the following overall assessment of the House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights, although the Committee is concerned that the system does not apply to non-resident patients or patients in residential homes. The latter is clearly impossible to justify, since the only difference is type of venue, 39 the former is hard to justify, especially when account is taken of the fact that, under the Mental Incapacity Act it is the decision and its effect that matters not where someone happens to be. If the regime is to exist at all, it should apply to all compliant, incapable patients.
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"We welcome the clear structure for decision-making which the draft Bill would introduce in relation to the treatment of … informal patients. We also welcome the element of independent review by medical adviser and MHT, and the ability of the nominated person to trigger those mechanisms. We consider that these steps constitute major protections for the human rights of patients who are unable to consent to treatment but do not require compulsory treatment." 
Compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights
Compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights is a laudable objective for the Mental Health Act, and is required by the Human Rights Act 1998. It produces some important and welcome changes, such as the need to involve an independent organisation, the Mental Health Tribunal, prior to longer term admission, 42 the provision of a right of appeal to a Mental Health Appeal Tribunal on a point of law, and the burden of proof lying on those alleging the need for detention rather than on the patient. 43 Further, the legislation underlines the need for the continued presence of the criteria that warranted original detention and to require release when the patient's condition gets better. 44 But, the power of professionals other than the Tribunal to discharge a patient (and in particular the patient's clinical supervisor 45 ) appears to have been removed, and so there may be a longer delay than is necessary before someone is indeed discharged, which would be contrary to the ECHR. In any case, compliance with the ECHR should never be regarded as sufficient. The Convention does not cover all human rights issues and is time-framed, despite the commitment to its dynamic interpretation, by its ratification in the 1950s. Thus, simply because a proposal is Convention compliant does not necessarily mean that it is right. It is Convention compliant to detain a person as a "person of unsound mind" 46 without treating them, as the requirements of Article 5(1)(e) of the Convention do not demand treatment.
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It is entirely possible that the detention of an untreatable person of unsound mind could eventually be held to fall outside the Convention. Because of the European Court's commitment to a dynamic interpretation of the Convention, no interpretation is set in stone. Draft Mental Health Bill, (25th Report of Session 2001-02; HL Paper 181; HC 1294 ), at para. 59. 44 Johnson v United Kingdom (1997 ) 27 E.H.R.R. 196, and see Winterwerp v Netherlands (1979 ) 2 E.H.R.R. 387 and Luberti v Italy (1984 ) 6 E.H.R.R. 440. 45 Under the Mental Health Act 1983 
Definition of mental disorder and conditions for detention
One of the relevant conditions for compulsory admission to hospital is the presence of a mental disorder.
49 This is very widely defined in the proposed Act in clause 2:
"'Mental disorder' means any disability or disorder of mind or brain which results in an impairment or disturbance of mental functioning…."
Further, there is no equivalent to the Mental Health Act 1983, section 1(3), which excludes some things from being a mental disorder. 50 The argument for the change is 51 that some clinicians have mistakenly assumed that it means that someone who is dual diagnosed as an alcoholic and with mental illness or someone whose alcoholism has caused mental illness does not have a mental disorder. This interpretation of the current s. 1(3) is plain wrong and it is completely unsustainable. The better solution, therefore, is either to educate or guide the practitioners better or to clarify the provision.The approach of removing the exclusions is not justified for the reason given. What is proposed is extraordinarily wide, but it is the view of the Government that its application is limited by the need for the other relevant conditions to be present 52 and the need for the professionals to develop a care plan. The relevant conditions are stated at clause 6 as being the following. "(3) The second condition is that that mental disorder is of such a nature or degree 53 (4) The third condition is -(a) in the case of a patient who is at substantial risk of causing serious harm to other persons, that it is necessary for the protection of those persons that medical treatment be provided to him, and (b) in any other case, that -(i) it is necessary for the health or safety of the patient or the protection of others persons that medical treatment be provided to him, and
(ii) that treatment cannot be provided to him unless he is subject to the provisions of this Act.
(5) The fourth condition is that appropriate medical treatment is available in the patient's case."
The question, therefore, is whether the draft Bill will have much wider application through a different approach to the definition of mental disorder. 55 The Government does not expect it to be "used as a means of social control, nor to detain anyone simply because their sexual preferences diverge from the norms of society, nor to detain anyone who does not have a mental disorder." 56 However, concerns have been expressed that it could be applied to people who should not be regarded as potential subjects for mental health legislation. Any swift review of the international classifications of mental disorder will reveal that a number of conditions appear in either or both of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic Statistical Manual or the World Health Organisation's International Classification of Diseases and Disorders that cannot credibly be argued to be a mental disorder at all or that could warrant compulsory admission to hospital. Under the criminal law, it is the case that any internal cause of an inability to know what one is doing or to know that it is legally wrong raises the defence of insanity, 57 such that a person attacking another when suffering an epileptic fit is claiming that defence when saying that they did not know what they were doing, 58 similarly a person with diabetes who has not taken their insulin.
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"The prospect of a Mental Health Act being used to authorise compulsory treatment of people suffering from diabetes or epilepsy is unattractive." 60 It is much worse than that! Further, could the new approach lead, as has been suggested, presumably more credibly by Zigmond, 61 to people with multiple sclerosis or Parkinson's disease or mild anxiety being compulsorily detained under the draft Bill?
Even if doctors might view these as a mental disorder within the proposed definition, it is hard to see on what basis all the other conditions would be satisfied. But the warning is worthy of recognition and rather than rely upon the appropriate use of the Act by clinicians and the work Health, Mental Health Bill: Consultation Document (2002 , Cm 5538-III), at para. 3.22. 57 M'Naghten's case (1843 Bratty v Attorney General for Northern Ireland [1963] A.C. 386; R v Sullivan [1984 ] A.C. 156. 58 R v Sullivan [1984 ] A.C. 156. 59 R v Hennessy [1989 
